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Abstract— Since the introduction of Internet of Things (IoT), e-
health has become one of the main research topics. Due to the 
sensitivity of patient data, preserving the privacy of patients 
appears to be challenging. In healthcare applications, patient data 
are usually stored in the cloud, which makes it difficult for the 
users to have enough control over their data. However, due to the 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), it is the data 
subject’s right to know where and how his data has been stored, 
who can access his data and to what extent. In this paper, we 
propose a blockchain-based architecture for e-health applications 
which provides an efficient privacy-preserving access control 
mechanism. We take advantage of Blockchain (BC) special 
features, i.e., immutability and anonymity of users, while 
modifying the classic blockchain structure in order to overcome 
its challenges in IoT applications (i.e., low throughput, high 
overhead and latency). To this end, we cluster the miners of BC, 
store and process data at the nearest cluster to the patient. While 
our proposal is a work in progress, we provide a security analysis 
of our proposed architecture. 
Keywords— Healthcare, IoT, Blockchain, Privacy 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Internet of Things (IoT) implies that any device can be 
connected to other devices and Internet at anytime and 
anywhere. Researchers estimated that over 75 billion devices 
will be connected to Internet by 2025 [1]. Aside from the 
advantages that the connectivity of devices in IoT has in 
several different scenarios, there are a variety of challenges 
especially in terms of security and privacy. One of the main 
applications of IoT is e-health, where different types of 
wearable sensors measure patient’s blood glucose, heart rate, 
body temperature, blood pressure, etc. These sensors 
automatically collect data about users and transfer them to a 
central storage or cloud for further processing by physicians, 
nurses and medical staff [2]. 
Patients’ data are privacy sensitive, usually stored on a 
server and processed remotely. This raises patients concern 
regarding the confidentiality and privacy of their data. This is 
due to the fact that several security attacks are possible in such 
scenarios, e.g., an attacker can intercept healthcare data on 
Internet; modify them and inject wrong data in healthcare data 
centers, or she can steal information from the remote servers 
[3]. 
The traditional privacy-preserving methods that are based 
on summarizing or creating noisy data [4] are not efficient in 
healthcare applications where users’ original data are required 
for medical treatments. To address this issue, recently 
researchers proposed new privacy-preserving schemes based 
on Blockchain (BC) technology [5, 6]. BC is an immutable 
timestamp ledger of blocks that is used for storing and sharing 
data in a distributed manner by a peer to peer network [7]. 
Blocks in BC are shared across all participating nodes which 
eliminates the need for a central authority [8].  
There are a number of challenges in applying BC to IoT 
scenarios: i) Network overhead, which is due to consensus 
operations especially in Proof-of-Works (POWs) for adding a 
new block and broadcasting transaction to all the participants; 
and ii) Low throughput, as the number of transactions that can 
be recorded in BC is low which is not acceptable considering 
the scale of IoT applications [8]. Nowadays, several research 
studies have adopted BC for storing users’ healthcare data [9] 
[10]. However, to the best of our knowledge, the application 
of BC for improving data privacy remained uninvestigated in 
the literature. Researchers in [11] mentioned the irreversibility 
nature of BC (everybody has a copy of the ledger) as a 
possible reason, since this makes it hard to use BC for privacy 
purposes, particularly in data protection.  
In this paper, we propose a BC-based access control 
architecture which preserves privacy of the patients. We store 
the hash of patient’s healthcare data instead of the original 
data. We modify the general BC architecture to improve its 
efficiency in the healthcare domain as follows: 
1) We cluster the miners to reduce data redundancy and 
prevent the involvement of all miners in the consensus 
operation. Moreover, in order to decrease the network 
overhead, we reduce the size of transactions to be light 
for transmitting over BC. 
2) To address privacy and security challenges, we store 
and process data at the nearest location to the patient 
while each patient is assigned a pseudonym.  
II. RELATED WORK 
Several researchers have modified the BC architecture to 
overcome classic BC challenges in IoT scenarios. In [12], 
authors proposed optimal BC for IoT platform in the case 
study of smart home. They used a hierarchical structure to 
improve the scalability, throughput and the overhead in the 
BC network. They also analyzed privacy and security. In [13] 
authors highlighted the limitations of using common 
cryptographic and access control methods in cloud 
environment. They explored the possibility of adopting BC to 
protect patient’s healthcare data that is stored in the cloud. The 
researcher in [14] propose a framework based on modified BC 
for IoT devices. In [10] a framework named Ancile is 
introduced that utilizes smart contract on Etherum-based BC 
for preserving user privacy and control access to the patients’ 
sensitive information. 
In the above-mentioned research studies, the data that is 
generated by IoT devices are distributed in the network and 
data owner does not have direct control over them. In this 
paper, we propose an architecture to enable the patients 
choose their own access control policy to define who and how 
can access their data.  
III. PROPOSED BC-BASED ARCHITECTURE 
In our proposed architecture, BC is used for storing hash 
of users’ healthcare data and also users’ access policy over 
their data. The policies are used for specifying who can access 
the users’ data. Our system model is composed of the 
following main modules (Figure 1 shows our system model). 
1) Sensors that are attached to the patient’s body. 
2) Patient’s smartphone or PDA (Personal Digital 
Assistance). 
3) A central server which manages and stores the 
patient’s healthcare data, so-called IHM (IoT Health 
Manager). 
4) Hospitals and health centers. 
5) Blockchain network. 
6) Miners. 
A. Sensors connected to the patient's body 
Each patient can carry a large number of sensors attached 
to his body which are responsible for gathering patient’s 
information, such as blood pressure, and heart rate. These 
sensors are resource-constrained; having low energy, low 
storage and low processing power. By considering these 
limitations, sensors send the collected data using short-range 
communication, such as zigbee or Bluetooth, to a more 
powerful device, such as a smartphone or a PDA, which plays 
the role of a gateway to transfer data to the healthcare servers. 
B. Patient’s smartphone or PDA 
PDA and smartphones have higher processing power and 
battery life compared to the sensors. They are able to carry out 
heavy tasks, such as cryptographic operations, and packet 
transmission via long-range communications, such as cellular 
networks to IHM (describe in Section 3.3).  
C. IHM (IoT Healthcare Manager) 
IHM could be a simple PC for storing patient’s dat, which is 
responsible for the following operations: 
 Receiving information from smartphones and storing 
them. 
 Performing hash and other cryptographic operations 
 Transferring hash of the data and policies to the 
health center blockchain network. 
D. Hospitals and health centers 
The Hospitals and health centers can be enlarged to 
include all health centers of a country. They manage the users’ 
data, BC network and miners. They receive and store hash of 
user’s data and policies from IHMs. They are responsible for: 
 Registering users (patient, medical staff, etc.) and 
assigning a health wallet (HW) (similar to the wallet 
in the bitcoin) to each of them which could be used to 
communicate with the BC network. 
 Allocating a cluster miner to each patient (see 
Section IVF. Mining and miners). 
E. Blockchain 
BC is basically used for storing hash of data and access 
policies to improve integrity and availability of users’ data. 
Storing such data in BC prevents against single point of failure 
and DoS attack. We use two separate ledgers for storing hash 
of users’ data and policies. These two types of transactions 
have different structures and policy management will be easier 
(see Section IV. USERS’ DATA POLICIES). 
F. Mining and miners 
In our architecture, there are a number of miners in each 
hospital and health center. The miners validate new 
transactions and record them on BC ledger. However, we 
could also use miners outside the health centers, though there 
are challenges such as how to convince and motivate miners 
outside the hospital to store data. Considering that we are 
dealing with a large number of devices in IoT, adopting POW 
is not affordable. Therefore, we use a new method called 
Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) voting-based 
consensus [15], which involves multiple rounds of voting by 
all nodes of the network. This helps us to increase the network 
Fig.  1.  Proposed system model 
security and efficiency, as well as reducing network cost, i.e., 
bandwidth and processor usage.  
In the traditional BC network, all nodes should store 
redundant data, which are the same copy of ledger, for 
providing data integrity. This is actually helpful in financial 
systems, such as cryptocurrency, but significantly reduces 
network throughput. This is due to the fact that each 
transaction must be distributed to all the nodes of the network. 
To avoid such an overhead, we cluster our miners and store 
each patient’s healthcare data in one cluster. Each cluster 
operates independently, while all of them are simultaneous. 
This balances the load between different clusters. 
IV. USERS’ DATA POLICIES 
A specific feature of our architecture is that users are able to 
specify access policies over their data. Users send policies in 
the form of a transaction to cluster miners in BC network. A 
policy could be defined as follows:  
< 𝐼𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟 , 𝐼𝐷𝑟𝑒𝑞 , 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒, 𝑇𝑒 , < 𝐷𝑠 , 𝐷𝑒 >, 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑 > 
 𝐼𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟 : The id of policy creator, i.e., the patient, 
e.g. Alice. 
 𝐼𝐷𝑟𝑒𝑞: The id of the person who can access the data, 
e.g. Dr. Bob. 
 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒: The kind of data which can be accessed by 
users, e.g.  ECG information. 
 𝑇𝑒 : The expiration date of policy. 
 < 𝐷𝑠, 𝐷𝑒 >: This attribute specifies time duration that 
the allowed users can access to data. For example, 
Dr. Bob is allowed to access the Alice’s data from 
2018/02/10 to 2018/03/10. 
 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑: This attribute gets a binary (0 or 1) value to 
determine the validity of the policy, 1 and 0 for valid 
and invalid policies, respectively. As BC ledger is 
immutable, the users can’t change a specified policy 
before its expiration time. In case of emergency, 
users can insert a new policy with different 
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑 attribute in BC. In that case, users’ last policy 
will be considered by minors for checking access 
control of users’ data. 
V. ARCHITECTURE EXPLANATION 
In this section, we describe the functioning of different 
modules in our architecture and their communication using a 
simple usecase scenario. Suppose that Alice has received an 
ID, a pair of private and public keys, as well as an HW from a 
hospital. She is wearing some sensors and has a smartphone 
(or a PDA) to receive data from the sensors. The following 
steps show how Alice’s healthcare data will be registered and 
accessed by a medical staff (refer to Figure 1): 
1) In the first step, Alice’s smartphone receives data 
from the sensors. PDA classifies them according to 
the type of sensor (such as EEG and ECG) and sends 
them to the IHM.  
2) Alice’s IHM decrypts the data and stores them in a 
database. IHM computes the hash of the data and 
encrypts it using an asymmetric cryptographic 
method (e.g. ECC). Then it sends the encrypted data 
in the form of a transaction to Alice’s predetermined 
cluster miner in BC. Each minor of the cluster 
receives Alice’s transaction and stores it in BC.  
3) If a medical staff wants to access Alice’s healthcare 
data, he should create a transaction (i.e., request a 
transaction) specifying Alice’s ID. This transaction is 
sent to the cluster in which the Alice's data is stored. 
4) Alice’s data policies will be checked by the miners. If 
Alice’s policies contain the requesting medical staff’s 
id, then the data and the location of the data is 
encrypted with medical staff’s public key and will be 
forwarded to the medical staff. 
5) After receiving the response about the access 
transaction, the medical staff can access to the hash 
of Alice’s data, and decrypt it with his private key. 
6) Finally, medical staff sends a message including hash 
of Alice’s data to Alice’s IHM. Alice’s IHM decrypts 
the message and retrieves hash value. If this hash 
value is valid, it returns Alice’s data, otherwise 
returns an access denied message. 
VI.  SECURITY AND PRIVACY ANALYSIS 
 In this section, we discuss the performance of the proposed 
architecture in terms of security and privacy. We analyse the 
CIA security triad (Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability) 
of our architecture to show its resilience against several attacks. 
First, we explain the CIA triad aspects in our specific context.  
 Confidentiality: Confidentiality means that the 
messages should be accessed only by authorized 
users. To provide confidentiality, we encrypt the 
communication between modules, which guarantees 
the users’ data (generated by the sensors) will be 
protected against sniffing by unauthorized users.  
 Integrity: The data integrity insures no one can 
change the stored data without permission. BC is 
inherently resistant to modification of the data. BC 
ledgers are immutable, so the BC data cannot be 
updated. 
 Availability: The availability of the data is due to 
thedistributed feature of the adopted BC, where data 
is stored in all miner nodes instead of a central server. 
We consider six attack scenarios, and analyse the 
resilience of our architecture against each of them (refer to 
Table 1). 
TABLE 1. Security Analysis of the Proposed Architecture 
Attack Definition Defence Resilience 
Appending 
Attacker compromises a miner and generates 
blocks with fake transactions. 
Due to the usage of private BC, as well as a good number of miners in 
each cluster, users cannot generate fake blocks, whereas any 
transaction is only verified by miners in the clusters. 
High 
Denial of Service 
(DOS) 
The attacker uses HW to generate large 
number of transactions to disrupt the BC 
network. 
 Limited number of transactions that can be sent by HW. 
 Due to clustering, traction flooding will affect only a subset of 
clusters instead of all the nodes of the network. 
 After receiving a few messages from a specific user, the rest of 
the user’s transactions will be rejected. 
High 
Distributed DOS 
(DDOS) 
This is a distributed version of the above 
attack. 
 Limited number of transactions can be sent by a valid HW. 
 The miners check that received transactions have been produced 
by a valid ID and HW. 
Moderate 
Modification 
Attack 
Malicious modification or removal of the 
stored hash and policies of the patient’s data 
Due to the usage of BC immutable ledger High 
Public BC 
Modification 
Attacker advertises a false ledger and makes it 
as the longest ledger. 
We use private BC within the hospitals and health centers, so the 
miners are not from outside the organization to create malicious block. 
High 
51% attack 
The attacker controls more than 51% of miners 
and tries to compromise the consensus 
algorithm and generate fake block 
The probability that all the cluster miners from various health 
centers are compromised to change the data is very low based on PBFT 
and consensus methods [15]. 
High 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this work, motivated by the privacy challenge of 
patients’ healthcare data in e-health use case, we proposed a 
new architecture based on the blockchain technology. Our 
proposed architecture (which is a work in progress) enables 
users to have full control over their sensitive data that are 
collected by their wearable sensors. In this architecture, users 
can store access control policies over their data in BC to 
specify who can accessed their data and to what extent. 
Considering different attack models, we discussed the security 
of our architecture against those attacks. In the future we are 
going to implement the architecture and perform experimental 
analysis to evaluate the performance of the proposed 
architecture. 
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